Health and illness in contemporary psychology are remarkably undertheorized, with the consequence that implicit definitions of these topics are unquestionably imported into health psychology. Largely inspired and oriented to the medical system, health psychology is often subservient to biomedically inspired theory or directed to solving the problems of the health care system, not those of its patients or those who might ultimately benefit from health knowledge. Qualitative approaches have attempted to reintroduce the voice of the patient/sufferer/individual back into health psychology but without adequate theoretical integration this work has been marginalized and ignored by mainstream health psychology in the service of medical modelling. The point is not to develop a health psychology as an exclusive disciplinary enclave but rather to open up the possibilities of a responsible knowing. Using Kathryn Addelson's work on professional knowing I argue that the collective activity that constitutes health psychology can be made more explicit not only by devising reflexive theories and practices but by focusing on what the outcomes of that activity might be. Functional theories of health and illness, on the other hand, obscure our epistemological and moral commitments.
T H I S A RT I C L E I S , simply put, a plea for theory. One of the reasons for propagating the work of theorizing came out of my own practice as a psychologist, now a decade ago, of working in a cancer treatment setting as both a clinical and a research psychologist. It is, I think, not necessary to enumerate the kinds of personal, institutional and political problems one is confronted with in such settings to say that there was a wide gulf between practice and the literature on health psychology or behavioural medicine (cf. Stam, 1988 Stam, , 1992 . Although I eventually decided that my contributions to a 'politics of care' could be more effectively made outside rather than inside biomedicine, I have continued to remain involved in health care institutions and research in peripheral ways. I should note here that Health Psychology is (and can be) far more than what is covered by the clinical focus of what is sometimes referred to as Clinical Health Psychology. Although heavily involved in and influenced by clinical issues for reasons having to do with the social and economic organization of clinical psychology, health psychology includes studies and problems that range from community research and studies that have implications for health policy to considerations of individual problems of adjustment to illness. What I have to say about theory is generally relevant to all of these dimensions even though I chose examples that come predominantly from the latter domain (see also Marks, 1996; Spicer & Chamberlain, 1996; Stainton Rogers, 1996) .
As will become clear below, by theory I do not have in mind a conception based on the traditional notions of reductionism, instrumentalism or realism in the philosophy of science. Indeed, neither do most psychologists for that matter, who treat theory as mere variants of functionalist claims that resemble hypotheses but whose actual foundations are left somewhere floating in mid-air (see Stam, 1996 , in press, for a discussion). My conception of theory is primarily governed by its reflexive properties or the claim that the researcher shares in a nontrivial way the practices of the community that he or she investigates, practices that are premised on shared linguistic and cultural customs. I will draw out several implications of this for theory and practice below.
By referring to a politics of care, above, I mean just those aspects of health care which are contested and configured in the activities of those who make up, provide and use biomedicine. These activities are constituted discursively and an exploration of care-talk necessarily leads to a deconstruction of traditional categories of health care as well as an invocation of understanding such categories in terms of subjectivities, power and knowledge (see Fox, 1994) . In addition, these activities are constituted collectively and an exclusive focus on individual actors usually obfuscates the complex moral/power relations involved.
These concerns seem a long way from the 'worlds' created or constructed by contemporary health psychology around a set of limited professional topics, but the connection between a politics of care and these topics I wish to draw here is precisely by way of the problem of theory. In short, I want to make the case that theory is not a luxury or what one does in one's armchair after a hard day of collecting data. On the contrary, it is one of the most crucial steps of our entry into the world of health, disease and illness precisely because it establishes nothing less than our political, epistemological and moral grounding. It also establishes our responsibility as professionals who intervene in the lives of others even if done at the level of research. At the same time, it announces our commitments in advance, locating us as professionals among other professions and clients. As such we had best try to get clear the grounds of our interventions. In addition, we do not, and I would argue we cannot, do this alone.
I am now not only making claims that are relevant to health psychology; disciplinary boundary maintenance is particularly troublesome for any critical project that seeks to open for investigation the grounds of its own practice. Moreover, other social scientific disciplines similarly involved in the health care system have engaged in serious theoretical work for many years. Certainly sociologists, anthropologists and some psychologists are a case in point; it is difficult to imagine, for example, a Bryan Turner, an Emily Martin or an Alan Radley seriously proposing the kind of claim that one author in Health Psychology made recently. He said at the conclusion of a long and complex empirical study on a chronic illness that the theoretical significance of his study was that stress and coping variables are related in different ways to various dimensions of adjustment. 1 Since such 'findings' are entirely obvious, and indeed, may not require empirical research at all (cf. Smedslund, 2000 and commentaries) , the practice of research has more to do with institutional and career progress than the generation of new knowledge.
The discipline of health psychology
The hegemonic position of clinical psychology and the vast extension of biomedicine following the Second World War in the North-Atlantic world, and especially the English-speaking part of that world, has led to an unprecedented domination of health topics in the social sciences by psychologists. The emergence of Managed Care in the USA and the related move to provide empirically validated treatments, supported by the American Psychological Association among others, means that the dominance of what I will call 'mainstream health psychology' will continue. In addition, health psychology remains a growing area of academic and applied psychology in North America as well as one of the more common areas where many psychologists find employment (Stone et al., 1987; Taylor, 1999) . The mission statement of Division 38 (Health Psychology) of the American Psychological Association (1996) contains the following: 'Psychologists are in increasing demand in health and medical settings. The single largest area of placement of psychologists in recent years has been in medical centers'. Through the use of licensing, continuing education and the like, the dominance of a mainstream perspective is institutionally defined and maintained. There are two obvious consequences of this:
1. For health psychology, biomedical authority and all its related social, financial and institutional supports remains a benign provider of health care and a duly constituted authority on health and illness. The contested and shifting political, social and economic forces engaged in and by the health care system and their profound consequences for the clients of that system are, to health psychology, psychologically uninteresting and unimportant. 2. A singular form of research is treated as the ultimate tool of knowledge, and this research is presented in terms of its adherence to a methodologically fixed set of principles that suppress the discursive, social constitution of health care and its hierarchical allocation of resources, as well as the negotiated and collective constitution of 'health' and 'illness'.
I do not wish to argue that mainstream health psychology has no theory, but instead that it is theory of a particular kind. Although health psychologists claim to rely on several models, including systems theory, biopsychosocial theory and self-regulatory theories, among others, these are all variants of functionalism. For example, systems theory has been espoused as providing a foundation for understanding adaptive mechanisms (e.g. Stone, 1980 , Taylor, 1999 . However, systems theory, especially the version that circulates in health psychology, adheres in practice to the three necessary conditions for a functionalist model (EvansPritchard, 1951) : first, systems are natural phenomena with interdependent levels that serve to maintain the system; second, within systems theory social events are reduced to empirical relationships that are predictable; and third, systems theory is ahistorical about the makeup of systems. In this sense systems theory is neutral about the nature of biomedical systems. Within the context of health and health care, such a functional view espouses a concept of persons as well-tuned machines (rather than sentient beings) whose actions are intelligible in larger control systems. Self-regulatory models are likewise driven by functional considerations; the 'self', however conceived, is entirely absent in these formulations.
The biopsychosocial model
The 'biopsychosocial' position and related concepts have a unique role in health psychology. Engel's original publication in Science in 1977, where the term originated, was primarily a critique of biomedicine. Only the latter half of his article concerned itself with the biopsychosocial model proper and most of this is by way of example rather than the development of a model, theory or position. In fact he does not even define the term but argues that the 'model must . . . take into account the patient, the social context in which he [or she] lives, and the complimentary system devised by society to deal with the disruptive effects of illness, that is, the physician's role and health care system' (p. 132). Furthermore, argues Engel, the dichotomy between 'disease' and certain 'problems of living' is clear neither for patient nor for physician. As an example he describes the case of grief. It exemplifies a phenomenon in which psychological factors are primary yet it constitutes a discrete syndrome with a relatively predictable symptomatology which includes bodily and psychological disturbances. A biopsychosocial model would merely take all of these factors into account, and Engel alludes in his conclusion to the relationship between the biopsychosocial model and systems theories.
It is an interesting phenomenon in its own right that such a loose formulation has become the rhetorical mainstay of theory in health psychology (see Stam, 1988) . I surveyed five recent health psychology textbooks and found that the term 'biopsychosocial' is now thoroughly embedded in the discipline. Indeed it appeared almost obligatory to mention the model although none of the texts cite papers beyond the original formulations by Engel (e.g. 1977) or the revision published by Schwartz in 1982. The 'model' has simply been taken for granted and, remarkably, there is absolutely no discussion of what this term could mean other than the 'interplay' or 'interaction' of biological, psychological and social factors. Taylor (1999) is even less committed by noting that these three factors are merely 'involved' in the model. No author notes that this is neither a theory nor a model. 2 Indeed, I think it is sufficient to say that it is a clever neologism masquerading as a model and its naive distribution to undergraduates ought to lead us to urge publishers to place a warning label on textbooks indicating that they are a danger to the health of one's theoretical education. 3 On the other hand, the absence of theory and the vagueness of the model can be construed as a useful ploy because anything can be covered by it: anything remotely relevant counts as a topic under 'health'. As Shelley Taylor pronounces in the last sentence of her textbook on health psychology 'the opportunities for the fledgling health psychologist are boundless ' (1999, p. 489) . Opportunities indeed, so long as they don't interfere with institutional privileges. In short, the functionalist prescriptiveness and lofty inclusiveness of the biopsychosocial 'model' make it a useful rhetorical device for the appropriation of a set of topics in health and illness into psychological practice and research.
From the perspective of professionalization, this is an exercise of 'social closure' (Turner, 1986 ) wherein a profession's knowledge base serves as a strategy of market regulation. Although such a view might be construed as strictly concerned with the political and social role played by health psychology, it is not entirely surprising given that psychology is continually in competition with neighbouring disciplines for the same territory. Family medicine, community medicine, nursing, social work, epidemiology, sociology of health and other healthrelated disciplines have marked as their domain certain problems and topics in health care that are also part of the practice and research repertoire of health psychologists. These include topics such as the family, living with chronic illness, prevention of diseases, and so on. In that sense, part of health psychology's success is derived from its capacity to innovate and to secure new markets, clients and rewards.
In a related sense it is strange, if not suspicious, that discussions of the deeply contested, political and social issues that make up health care today are absent from health psychology. One of the major expenses of western governments, individuals and families is health and health care. Dominated by mixed models of physicians as private entrepreneurs/public servants who work within both private and public medical facilities, health care has been (in the post-war period) and still is, in a constant state of crisis and restructuring. The biomedical model has been challenged on many fronts and a steady growth and proliferation in health professions and specialties (within medicine but also in dentistry, pharmacy, and so on) and complementary occupations (nursing, physiotherapy, laboratory specialists) have transformed the health labour force. As other groups have joined this labour force through a strategy of professionalization (among others, psychologists, chiropractors and nurses), and administrative and support services have proliferated, the medical domain has become a contested and fragmented one (see Aries & Kennedy, 1990; Burke & Stevenson, 1993) . As if this is occurring in another world, psychologists ignore and suppress these events and their impact on their own research and practices, their conceptions of health and illness and, perhaps fatally, the importance of these considerations for their intended end-users, the research participants and the ill. 4 However, despite the crucial importance of the structural background to health psychology, this appears to me to be an incomplete picture. It paints psychologists as ignorant of the world they inhabit or as ruthless entrepreneurs in the same way that some critiques of medicine paint physicians as heartless technocrats. Such onedimensional caricatures may make sense of the background activities that make a profession possible; what is at stake, however, is not the individual motivation of psychologists but the constitution of health psychology as a collective practice. What functionalist theory allows is the discursive construction of health and illness as a set of variables whose identification is obvious and whose analysis requires no more than the use of aggregate statistics that allow one to make simple yes/no judgments. I wish to say a few words about this which I hope will clarify my understanding of theory when I return to the question of theory as a moral project.
Methodology and the constraints on theory
Like theory in psychology generally, what passes for theory in health psychology is loosely related to a version of positivism (modelled on the philosophical version of logical positivism) that has dominated psychology since mid-century. According to the philosophical version of logical positivism, a theory is no more than an axiomatized collection of sentences that has a specified relationship to a set of observables. This relationship (dependent on a theory of verification) was much in dispute for the life of logical positivism. Psychology generally bypassed this view (and the concomitant debate). Instead, it has relied on the 19th-century positivism of Ernst Mach that was gradually modified and introduced into psychological research through behaviourism with an explicit emphasis on observation as the key element of scientific research (Danziger, 1990; Mills, 1998; O'Neil, 1995) . On this view observations were separate from theory, and gradually came to rely on models, such as Hull's, which were 'deductive-nomonological' in nature. Theories in this context came to mean statements that had a specific relationship to the events to be explained, a deductive-nomonological relationship. In the ideal case the theory was a universal law that could act as a 'covering law' that explains the events under consideration.
For all its elegance, the model can be seen in very little research after that of Clark Hull. Practically, the development of inferential statistics and the demise of behaviourism as an all-encompassing theory for psychology led to a much more liberal approach in understanding theoretical claims. Although the emphases on observation and quantification persisted and were strengthened by post-war generations of psychologists, inferential statistics encouraged the wider use of theoretical models or 'hypotheses' in psychology and discouraged formal theorization (with the exception of some areas such as mathematical psychology). It has only been the advent of cognitivism in the last 40 years that has gradually reintroduced theory in a more formal manner by way of (cognitive) functional analyses, analyses that have come to rely on and require the kind of statistical averaging used in tests of statistical inference.
Among the many consequences of the widespread adoption of statistical inference techniques in psychology, the most deleterious was their restriction of theoretical developments in the discipline (Gigerenzer, 1993; Stam & Pasay, 1998) . Kurt Danziger (1990) gives an account of how, in response to the demand for an applied knowledge, research came to be conducted on groups that were constituted so that they could be contrasted on an abstract variable. For example, research in intelligence demanded some conception of normative levels for the development of intelligence tests. Individual scores came to be reported in the aggregate and deviations were construed as 'error'. Aggregate scores, however, make it difficult to develop concepts about intra-individual processes and these were the most important to the development of the discipline. The introduction of inferential statistics solved this problem for psychologists, namely, it allowed the identification of psychological properties with the hypothetical distributions of statistical analyses. In other words, individual scores no longer mattered but rather the distribution of scores came to represent the theoretical processes at hand. For example, such processes as memory could be captured not by studying individual acts of remembering but by comparing how different groups ('experimental conditions') of individuals performed on some restricted task such as learning and recalling a list of nonsense syllables. The resulting, functional theoretical notion was one that no longer referred to any single participant in the experiment but instead to an abstract property of 'memory'.
Methodological prescriptions, including the requirement of confirmation through observations analysed using statistical inference techniques, severely constricted the possibilities of theory development. However sophisticated one's psychological notions, the indiscriminate use of tests of statistical inference led to a mechanical and routine use of the technique that by its very nature foreclosed rather than advanced theory (Gigerenzer, 1993) . Psychological theory remains relatively simple because the techniques of adjudication between theories require uncomplicated, elementary and simplified models and hypotheses. 5 More important yet for health psychology, the restriction of theory and the absence of a strong theoretical foundation allows the practices of psychologists to coincide with those of biomedicine. I do not claim that this is necessarily or always intentional; institutional prerogatives and agendas rarely are in any case. With its focus on prevention, adjustment and coping, health psychology considers 'healthy' the patient who has regained the ability to perform. Health in this sense is a functional entity, not one negotiated in a shifting discourse of health and illness encompassing the activities of falling ill or becoming well (see also Spicer & Chamberlain's notion of 'flowcharting ', 1996) . I would argue, however, that any substantial theorization of the psychology of health and illness and its subjectivization must begin by taking a critical distance from the discourse of biomedicine. This distancing is almost impossible to do in mainstream health psychology. Discursively and methodologically it is tied to a single simplified model, the very maintenance of which is also a strategic discursive act even as it masquerades as scientifically pure.
There are obviously occasions and questions associated with health that demand an empirical descriptive strategy. For example, we might want to know the motives for condom use among young adults (e.g. Cooper, Agocha, & Powers, 1999) or the relations among ethnicity, wealth and health (e.g. Ostrove, Feldman, & Adler, 1999) . Note, however, that many such questions are broadly epidemiological or social and not just psychological. That is, they concern social and community health questions, precisely the kinds of questions to which one wants to have descriptive data so that policy and practice issues can be brought to the fore. They do not even begin to address what is psychological about such issues.
What remains as theorizing in the mainstream of health psychology hides the professional and authorial source of knowledge, makes reciprocity between the source and the production of knowledge impossible, and treats the producers of that knowledge as professionals carrying out a job in the name of science. It is unreflexive about its knowledge production, namely that of constituent players engaged in the construction of health and illness. Behind its universalism lies an individualism that characterizes much of psychology; what the scientific knower knows is independent of who the knower happens to be, the knower's social position, and the use to which such knowledge is put.
I will not rehearse the multiple antidotes to this form of knowledge production that have been prescribed over the last four decades by theorists and methodologists in the name of various emancipatory or post-positivist projects. Feminism, critical theory, postmodernisms of various kinds as well as the wide prevalence of qualitative methods have sought to reclaim territory from the wider fields of health sciences just as these have pervaded other domains of psychology (e.g. Stainton Rogers, 1996) . Nevertheless, qualitative research does not, in itself, guarantee an escape from more traditional mainstream forms of knowledge production. It is an easy step to reformulate qualitative research so that it is yet another neutral method of inquiry that captures better, and implicitly, more faithful and true characterizations of health and illness. 6
Responsible health professionals
What multiple critical perspectives have foregrounded, however, is the place from which we do research or from which we practise. Feminist philosopher Kathryn Addelson has argued that as professionals, 'being morally responsible requires foresight in acting from one's place, foresight on the outcomes of collective activity in which one takes part' (Addelson, 1994, p. 18, original emphasis) . This means that we devise 'theories and practices that can make explicit what the collective activity is' and what the outcomes of that activity might be (p. 18). In other words, our interventions in health do not arise de novo from rational objective theories but always first and foremost from a discursive position within such seemingly objective theories that have as their ends the production of certain 'goods', be they function, adaptation, understanding, insight, and so on.
In addition, what the new epistemologies have taken from us is the possibility of a fixed, certain or rational standpoint from which to engage in professional activities. Instead, our activities are always politically engaged because of our positions as professionals in the social order. Reflexivity then means recognizing not only the inevitability of being so positioned but deciding what moral goods we will pursue in our activities.
Our cognitive authority as professionals is granted to us by the institutions that employ us. Indeed, Addelson argues that all professions, and this certainly includes the service professions, are obliged to have knowledge makers providing that 'difficult body of knowledge' that legitimates their professional status. And it is this body of knowledge that distinguishes professionals, such as health psychologists, from workers in other occupations. As health psychologists we use this knowledge to define more clearly the need that we in turn service. 7 Hence there is an intimate relationship between our knowledge base and our practical endeavours. If we define needs in terms of abstract functional variables such as coping and adjustment, or in terms of DSM criteria, our research priorities will reflect the objective and abstract definitions of those needs. That makes the service and research context simpler and more manageable. If, on the other hand, we negotiate these needs in the terms that the ill give us, in terms of their own life histories and in terms of their needs to negotiate a complex health system, then we also create more responsible but less comfortable service positions for ourselves.
However, it is not only needs and practices that we establish; we also have a hand in defining outcomes. When these are to be constituted as empirically verifiable constructs such as adjustment, 'quality of life' objectively defined or compliance with a medical regime, we deny that we are collectively, as a profession, defining a set of outcomes for others. The process of objectification denies the historical constitution of those outcomes. Historical constitution here means simply that outcomes always take place in collectives whether these range from the conversation between two people to the discussions that take place in a conference on health psychology (cf. Addelson, 1994) . Professional accounts of outcomes are special kinds of outcomes, produced in the context of and supporting existing social, political and economic orders.
To return for a moment to Kathryn Addelson's work, I would like to pursue her general proposal that 'truth' is always enacted in collective action. Our claims as professionals, even as critical or qualitative researchers, make sense so long as others recognize the talk. As collectives (such as at a conference or writing for, and reading, specialized journals) we then elaborate on, seek out further clarification of, and redefine our professional talk. But in our interactions with the ill or with other health care professionals we also come prepared and sensitized to the setting. Working on a defined terrain, we know how, from within our professional activities. Addelson argues that we are socially embodied actors who not only do professional work but in doing so are also significant moral and political actors. We are taken to be 'trustworthy instruments of governance' (p. 208).
What can be done
At this juncture it is not an unreasonable obligation on the critic that he or she should proffer some alternative to the problems here enumerated. I have two objections to this request: first, there is already sufficient critical, theoretical, morally informed research and writing in various literatures related to health. Large numbers of studies have been conducted inspired by a host of approaches that cover a wide range of phenomena and problems, albeit largely outside psychology (but see, for example, articles in this journal, the journal Health, or such examples-among many others-as Blair, 1993; Kleinman, 1996; Kugelmann, 1992; Mathieson & Stam, 1995; Radley, 1994; Toombs, 1992; Wennemo, 1993; Williams, 1993) . Such examples typically begin by conceptualizing the problems of health/illness outside the domains of biomedicine, locating it in lives as they are understood by the ill, in class consciousness, in culture and talk, and so on. What marks this literature is the separation of the institutional agenda from the experiential, the social and the access issues governing health care.
There seems to me a second, more compelling reason not to provide lists of problems and the manner in which I wish to see them addressed with appropriate methods/attitudes and the like. My concerns about the nature of functional theory, aggregate statistics and the need for moral reflexivity is to open up and create new possibilities for understanding health and illness that are not constrained by the turgid strictures of methodocentric preoccupations whose purpose appears sometimes limited to helping its authors become published and promote careers but do not fundamentally involve our understanding of the problems at hand. Or, as Daniel Robinson recently argued so elegantly, 'progress in science is won by the application of an informed imagination to a problem of genuine consequence; not by the habitual application of some formulaic mode of inquiry to a set of quasi-problems chosen chiefly because of their compatibility with the adopted method ' (2000, p. 41 ). However we conceive of science and its relation to health psychology, it is not going to progress in any sense of that word by following lists of prescribed formulations, even if those formulations come from well-meaning critical theorists.
Theorizing health and illness in psychology is not an abstract activity but one permanently embedded in how we approach our research and practice settings, participants and colleagues, how we conduct ourselves in those settings, and how we read the outcomes of those activities. At each stage we are engaged in the negotiation of health, disease and illness through a complex moral and social process. Our theories are, if you will, not only 'observation-laden' but also dependent on the place from which we theorize and generate knowledge.
To bring this into some kind of perspective, allow me to give two case studies that focus on the subtle relationship that exists between institutional commitments and knowledge claims. I am not giving examples of either research or how one ought to proceed. I want simply to locate the problem of the relationship between the professional, institutional context of our activities and our rational considerations of health and illness. The first case comes from Ruth Miltenburg, a Dutch health care activist and organizational consultant who has a debilitating chronic illness herself. Her understanding of being ill has been shaped by her conception of illness as a 'job' or 'profession'. Just like other jobs, one must learn it well in order to carry it off. But it is a difficult profession because it covers so many terrains that we normally do not have to deal with when we are not ill, including doctors and hospitals but also relationships, death, and so on (Miltenburg, 1998) . At a recent conference on nursing care she said that 'nursing care . . . is occupied with tasks that are better known at the United Nations as torture, namely, the systematic and organized deprivation of sleep and proper feeding . . . [the] disturbance of biorhythms, deprivation of freedoms, dehumanization and so on' (Miltenburg, 1997) . By juxtaposing the UN definition of torture with normal nursing care she brought the problem of 'care' into the moral, everyday domain and demanded that care at the very least requires the skill to think from two perspectives, not only from that of one's own profession but also from the perspective of the ill. Or, more precisely, the professional orientation so common to nursing frequently equates care with efficiency, time spent in hospital, physiological healing and the like. Such simple matters as obtaining sufficient sleep and a reasonable meal, which may be paramount to the patient, are not part of the nursing definition of 'care' and hence simply don't come to matter to institutional agendas.
Finally, I recently had the opportunity to sit on the medical admissions committee of my home university and witness more clearly how professional sensitivities operate. I initially thought that my early experience in the hospital would prime me for seeking out particularly good candidates for the medical profession. Confronted by the applications, however, I quickly realized that the lore and lure of professional medicine is such that it draws a relatively homogenous set of applicants. Virtually all of them are high achievers, many have had experiences with illness and death, have extensive volunteer experience and most are idealistic and express altruistic motives, at least their applications are rhetorically structured in such a way that they give the appearance of a relatively unique group of similar young adults. Once certain obvious (to the committee) candidates were excluded, one might think that the remainder were virtually chosen by lottery (as is the case in some countries). What I recognized among my own choices and those of my colleagues on the committee, however, was that these were far from random but gradually revealed a set of professional and personal concerns never articulated by the committee and not present in the admission criteria. We were sensitized by insiders' and professional concerns, capable of making judgments in the abstract about individuals we had never met, on the basis of fine details in their biographical reports or their application information. And although my own sensitivity was different from the physicians', it was there nonetheless, recognizable by the criteria that gradually came to make a difference to my judgments of 'yes' or 'no'.
The point of this story is not that the medical admissions committee should change its criteria or make its application process more effective or transparent. This would be merely to assume that fully rational and objective decisions about who can or cannot become a doctor are available. Indeed, medical schools present just such a face to the world, complete with discussions of criteria and their evaluation via research published in medical journals. Hence the process appears justifiably rational. My point, however, is only that such professional sensitivities are inevitable and ever-present in all our activities inside institutions, including medical ones. We never leave our moral commitments behind at the breakfast table, they follow us into the consulting room, the meeting room and the classroom. Furthermore, we negotiate them in practice so I am not advocating that we merely meditate on their implications. Instead, as we are doing in print, here, we work them out in action. It is for these reasons that our theoretical commitments are so crucial to our considerations of health and illness, for I see them as nothing less than an articulation of our political, epistemological and moral grounding.
Notes
1. This author is not alone or unique and I do not wish to single him out except that he was in a recent issue of the journal in question. This strategy of theorizing is ubiquitous, inside health psychology and out, and its historical and institutional foundations are sufficiently complex that I can only note this here (cf. Stam, 1996) . 2. Models in science are normally taken to be partial simulations derived from a theory and hence a limited test of a more advanced and developed theoretical formulation (Suppe, 1989) . In the social sciences, however, the term 'model' is often used loosely to describe a guiding formulation that is not related to a particular theory but is associated instead with functional properties. My argument here is that the 'biopsychosocial model' doesn't even approximate this looser use of the term 'model'. 3. An adaptation of an idea from Ian Lubek (1993) who has argued that social psychology textbooks should, like cigarettes, carry a warning about their potential hazards. 4. In health psychology there is almost no discussion of the ethical and economic limits of biomedicine that have become so apparent in the past decade and no recognition that the struggle to change lifestyles is at its worst a 'hypochondriacal narcissism of a privileged class shutting its eyes to the deterioration of the rest of the world' (Renaud, 1993) . 5. In less official publications, health psychologists acknowledge this problem. For example, using his presidential column in the APA Division 38 newsletter, Howard Leventhal remarked that 'many of our theories are little more than broad themes that guide but do not constrain our thinking; they are frames of reference rather than theories' (1996, p. 1). Unfortunately, Leventhal had no solution to this problem. 6. See the special issue of this journal edited by Murray and Chamberlain (1998) for a discussion of these problems. 7. By 'need' I do not mean just clinical need. I also mean the 'need' for more research that is opened up by any extant 'finding.'
